Ich beziehe mich auf Bill Whittle, zu dem ich gestern schon verlinkt habe:
Whittle beginnt mit dem “Prisoner’s Dilemma”
The Prisoner’s dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence payoffs and gave it the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” name (Poundstone, 1992).
The classical prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is as follows:
- Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal: if one testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both stay silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. However, neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. So this dilemma poses the question: How should the prisoners act?
The dilemma can be summarized thus:
||Prisoner B Stays Silent
||Prisoner B Betrays
|Prisoner A Stays Silent
||Each serves six months
||Prisoner A serves ten years
Prisoner B goes free
|Prisoner A Betrays
||Prisoner A goes free
Prisoner B serves ten years
|Each serves two years
By analysing the top-scoring strategies, Axelrod stated several conditions necessary for a strategy to be successful.
The most important condition is that the strategy must be “nice”, that is, it will not defect before its opponent does. Almost all of the top-scoring strategies were nice. Therefore a purely selfish strategy for purely selfish reasons will never hit its opponent first.
However, Axelrod contended, the successful strategy must not be a blind optimist. It must always retaliate. An example of a non-retaliating strategy is Always Cooperate. This is a very bad choice, as “nasty” strategies will ruthlessly exploit such softies.
Another quality of successful strategies is that they must be forgiving. Though they will retaliate, they will once again fall back to cooperating if the opponent does not continue to play defects. This stops long runs of revenge and counter-revenge, maximizing points.
The last quality is being non-envious, that is not striving to score more than the opponent (impossible for a ‘nice’ strategy, i.e., a ‘nice’ strategy can never score more than the opponent).
Therefore, Axelrod reached the Utopian-sounding conclusion that selfish individuals for their own selfish good will tend to be nice and forgiving and non-envious. One of the most important conclusions of Axelrod’s study of IPDs is that Nice guys can finish first.
The optimal (points-maximizing) strategy for the one-time PD game is simply defection; as explained above, this is true whatever the composition of opponents may be. However, in the iterated-PD game the optimal strategy depends upon the strategies of likely opponents, and how they will react to defections and cooperations. For example, consider a population where everyone defects every time, except for a single individual following the Tit-for-Tat strategy. That individual is at a slight disadvantage because of the loss on the first turn. In such a population, the optimal strategy for that individual is to defect every time. In a population with a certain percentage of always-defectors and the rest being Tit-for-Tat players, the optimal strategy for an individual depends on the percentage, and on the length of the game.
Ich zitiere nun aus Whittles Text YOU ARE NOT ALONE (Part 1)
(…) Tit-for-Tat combines generosity and toughness. And look at the terms used to describe the most successful strategic version of Tit-for-Tat: Nice. Retaliating. Forgiving. Non-envious.
Now, this is where my own analysis kicks in, because frankly, nice, retaliating, forgiving and non-envious pretty much sums up how I feel about the West in general and the United States in particular. The web of trust and commerce in Western societies is unthinkable in the Third World because the prosperity they produce are fat juicy targets for people raised on Screw the Other Guy. Crime and corruption are stealing, and stealing is Screwing the Other Guy. It’s short-term win, long-term loss.
Alright, now here come the brass tacks:
If you think about it, all of our laws – and indeed, the very idea of respect for and equality under the law – are written to protect Tit-for-Tat, because Tit-for-Tat produces the best results. You may sell your product at a profit, but if you lie about what it does we will call that fraud and you will go to jail because successful societies start nice but retaliate against those that decide to Screw the Other Guy. The punishment of fraud is what gives us confidence in the claims made by other products. Retaliating against Screw the Other Guy is not mean-spiritedness or a lust for revenge. It is essential to protect the confidence needed to stay focused on long-term wins. And that’s how, in theory, you build a cooperative society.
You retaliate against those that take advantage of the common trust. In other words, you punish the cheaters.
Society needs to retaliate against cheaters because not to do so flips the coin from cooperation to betrayal. And that’s the end of everything we have worked for and cherish.
(…) When a tipping point is reached – when enough people are allowed to cheat – the system swings to a different stability mode (the default mode) and Screw the Other Guy becomes the only rational choice.
Criminals need a lawless environment in order to prosper. When simple laws enforcing common decency – excessive noise, public urination – are not enforced, the signal goes out that this is a retaliation-free zone and the invisible skull-and-crossbones flag of Screw the Other Guy flies from every building. This is why where you find broken windows you will find every manner of vice under the sun and moon. Because if people can break windows without retaliation, then they know the rules and they know what strategy to play.
New York City now has a lower crime rate than London. Why? Because Rudy Giuliani and Bill Braxton made it a policy to enforce the small laws. (…)
Ich gehe davon aus, dass in den Gebieten unter israelischer Besatzung 1967 bis mindestens zum Ausbruch der 1. Intifada 1987 mehr Recht und Ordnung herrschte, als das vorher unter aegyptischer bsw. jordanischer Herrschaft der Fall war.
(…) The larger part, still untold in all its detail, is of the astounding social and economic progress made by the Palestinian Arabs under Israeli “oppression.” At the inception of the occupation, conditions in the territories were quite dire. Life expectancy was low; malnutrition, infectious diseases, and child mortality were rife; and the level of education was very poor. Prior to the 1967 war, fewer than 60 percent of all male adults had been employed, with unemployment among refugees running as high as 83 percent. Within a brief period after the war, Israeli occupation had led to dramatic improvements in general well-being, placing the population of the territories ahead of most of their Arab neighbors.
In the economic sphere, most of this progress was the result of access to the far larger and more advanced Israeli economy: the number of Palestinians working in Israel rose from zero in 1967 to 66,000 in 1975 and 109,000 by 1986, accounting for 35 percent of the employed population of the West Bank and 45 percent in Gaza. Close to 2,000 industrial plants, employing almost half of the work force, were established in the territories under Israeli rule.
During the 1970′s, the West Bank and Gaza constituted the fourth fastest-growing economy in the world-ahead of such “wonders” as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Korea, and substantially ahead of Israel itself. Although GNP per capita grew somewhat more slowly, the rate was still high by international standards, with per-capita GNP expanding tenfold between 1968 and 1991 from $165 to $1,715 (compared with Jordan’s $1,050, Egypt’s $600, Turkey’s $1,630, and Tunisia’s $1,440). By 1999, Palestinian per-capita income was nearly double Syria’s, more than four times Yemen’s, and 10 percent higher than Jordan’s (one of the betteroff Arab states). Only the oil-rich Gulf states and Lebanon were more affluent.
zitiert aus Efraim Karsh “What Occupation?” von 2002. Leider dominiert pal. Propaganda das Internet. Bis jetzt konnte ich keine halbwegs serioesen Daten entdecken, die die Entwicklung des GDP in der Westbank und im Gazastreifen historisch darstellen wuerden.
Ich wuerde weiter davon ausgehen, dass die 1. Intifada einen wirtschaftlichen Einbruck bedeutete und dass die ersten Jahre des Osloabkommens einen deutlichen Anstieg des GDPs ausloesten. Sehr schnell wirkte sich dann aber der Mangel an Recht und Ordnung auf die Wirtschaft aus:
W. Bank gunmen move from petty crime to organized extortion
Rising unemployment is pushing more and more young people into the ranks of armed gangs.
Fatah lawmaker Ahmed Shraim said that if the security forces don’t stop the extortionists, “the Palestinian economy will collapse because all businessmen will leave.”
Das System scheint gekippt zu sein: Die Grundlage von Trust und Goodwill fuer eine kooperierende Gesellschaft ist nicht mehr gegeben. Je mehr Geschaeftsleute ihre Assets liquidieren und die Gegend verlassen, desto weniger Arbeits- und/oder Verdienstmoeglichkeiten gibt es. Je hoeher die Arbeitslosigkeit, desto mehr junge Maenner fuehlen sich berechtigt, sich auf kriminelle Weise Geld und Geldeswert zu verschaffen. Ein Teufelskreis, in dem sich die beiden negativen Faktoren gegenseitig verstaerken.
Und die Perle zum Abschluss:
Zakariya Zubeidi, a leading Al Aksa gunman in the West Bank town of Jenin, acknowledged that some Fatah fighters are involved in crime. However, he tried to shift blame, saying members of the security forces were behind much of the extortion.
Die Sicherheitsleute sind bekanntlich in Personaluniion Fatahkaempfer…
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