veraendert sich die politische Landschaft in unserer Region.
We have heard for many years from an array of journalists, scholars, and pundits that Hamas and Hezbollah are complicated social movements that employ violence in the service of their political goals, and that they are therefore susceptible to diplomatic engagement. Such tropes about Hamas have become standard — that there should be a Fatah-Hamas unity government, that Israel should diplomatically engage Hamas, that Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections make the group a legitimate political player, etc. — and likewise, similar claims are made about Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon: that it is a legitimate representative of the Shia, that it can be negotiated with, that, like Hamas, the magic elixir of political integration will dissuade Hezbollah from its traditional behavior, which is to terrorize and dominate any system in which it participates.
The Hezbollah rampage in Lebanon that we are witnessing should make it obvious to any sentient observer that Hezbollah’s claims to democratic political legitimacy have always been intended only to manipulate the credulous. Participation in politics requires the willingness to persuade your foes, to compromise, to stand down when you don’t get your way. But there is no record of Hamas or Hezbollah ever observing such restrictions: the moment Hezbollah was confronted with political pressure, it responded not within the political sphere, but with warlordism — with an exhibition of violence intended to make clear not just that Hezbollah is the most powerful force in the country, but that challenging it will result in its enemies’ humiliation and dispossession. In the streets of Beirut, with Kalashnikovs and RPGs, Hezbollah is making it abundantly clear that its participation in Lebanese politics ends when Hezbollah is asked to submit to the state’s authority. How many more Middle East “experts” are going to proclaim that the answer to Islamic supremacism is dialogue and political integration?
zitiert aus Noah Pollak in Commentary: The Lesson of Lebanon (erster Link)
Auch Khaled Abu Toameh sieht das in der Jerusalem Post aehnlich:
Many Arab analysts see the events in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon as part of a conflict between two camps in the Arab world – one supported by Teheran and Damascus, and the other openly affiliated with the US.
The Iranians and Syrians are using their proxies in Hizbullah and Hamas to undermine the „moderate“ Arabs and to thwart what they see as Washington’s attempts to consolidate its „hegemony“ in the Middle East.
„The conflict in Lebanon is not between Sunnis and Shi’ites as the moderate Arabs claim,“ notes Abdel Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi daily. „Rather, it’s a conflict between a program of resistance [against Israel] and a program of surrender. This is a conflict between those who have sided with the US in its wars against the Arabs and those who are on the other side. This is a conflict between those who defeated and humiliated Israel and those who were defeated by Israel.“
Hamas has succeeded in creating an Islamic state in the Gaza Strip that is largely dependent on Iran and Syria for survival. And Hizbullah is now on its way to turning Lebanon into an extremist country that is controlled via remote control by Bashar Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
In both cases, the Iranians are providing the money and arms, while the Syrians are serving as couriers and facilitators.
Solange der Iran nicht ernsthaft angegangen wird, ist jede Nahostdiplomatie ziemlich obsolet, als wuerde ich staendig den Boden im Badezimmer aufwischen, aber nie den Hahn zudrehen…